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Summary 
Broadband wireless networks are providing internet and related 
services to end users. The three most important broadband 
wireless technologies are IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, and 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN). Security attacks and 
vulnerabilities vary amongst these broadband wireless networks 
because of differences in topologies, network operations and 
physical setups. Amongst the various security risks, Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack is the most severe security threat, as DoS 
can compromise the availability and integrity of broadband 
wireless network. In this paper, we present DoS attack issues in 
broadband wireless networks, along with possible defenses and 
future directions.  
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1. Introduction 
Broadband wireless networks provide high broadband 
internet access not only to home users but also to 
industries and other commodities. Today, broadband 
wireless networks are the hot topic for businesses, users 
and researchers. Initially, the cellular networks proved to 
be revolutionary technologies in the daily life of 
subscribers, after that the broadband wireless technology 
of IEEE 802.11 [11] is making progress rapidly. Now the 
last-mile 802.16 and the integrated technology of WMN 
are providing high bandwidth solution to the users.  
IEEE 802.11 which is also known as Wi-Fi is basically 
designed to fulfil the broadband requirements of an 
organization or limited group of users. IEEE 802.11 has 
replaced the Local Area Network (LAN), therefore it is 
also known as Wireless LAN (WLAN). The IEEE 802.16 
which is also termed as WiMax is Wireless Metropolitan 
Area Network (WMAN), giving more coverage as 
compared with the IEEE 802.11. Furthermore, it can be 
used to connect different WLAN technologies which are 
apart from each other. WMN is an integrated wireless 
broadband technology, which not only provide community 
based city-wide broadband services to end-users, but also 
integration of other wired and wireless networks such as 
IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, Cellular, and LANs. The 
WMN serves as a backbone wireless network for the 
integration of others.  
As these three broadband technologies are providing 
internet services to hundreds and thousands of end-users, 
organizations, and other commodities, hence their security 
is indeed necessary, as secure communication is the key of 
success for any wireless network especially broadband 
wireless networks. The internet connectivity adds extra 
level of security threats and complexities as compared to 
simple wireless networks. The three important features of 
a secure wireless broadband network are the 
confidentiality, data integrity and service availability. The 
confidentiality is mostly encountered by the passive 
attacks, integrity is threaten by active attacks, while the 
availability of the broadband wireless networks are 
compromised by the most severe form of active attack, i.e. 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks have the 
ability to bring down an entire broadband wireless 
networks. therefore DoS is treated as the highest security 
risk for any wireless network especially broadband 
wireless networks, as DoS uses the internet as a platform 
to be launched.  
This paper makes four principal findings. First, we 
compare the three versatile broadband wireless networks. 
Second, we provide a description of active and passive 
attacks in broadband networks. Third, we demonstrate the 
DoS attacks on these technologies. Finally, we introduce 
some DoS related affects and possible tackling directions.   
2. Broadband Networks Architecture 
Overview 
IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 wireless broadband 
technologies are difficult to deploy as they need 
centralized body to control, manage and monitor, and 
expensive maintenance cost. This is not in the case of 
WMN, as it is low cost, easily deployable, self-healing and 
self-configuring decentralized technology. The network 
architectures of IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16 and WMN are 
different as follows: 
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2.1 IEEE 802.11 
An IEEE 802.11 is a Wireless Local Area Network 
(WLAN) technology usually designed to provide wireless 
network access to an organization or enterprise. The 
motivation behind this technology was the support of 
mobile clients within a certain range and to provide 
wireless network infrastructure in such locations where 
wired networks are not feasible or possible. The 
architecture of 802.11 WLAN is given in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 IEEE 802.11 Architecture 
 
WLAN Consist of two important components, i.e. nodes 
and an Access Point (AP). The AP provides wireless 
connectivity to nodes as well as function as a bridge 
between the nodes and wired network infrastructure. The 
clients use Probe request frames to discover a wireless 
network, if a wireless network exist then the AP respond 
with Probe response frame. The clients select that AP 
which provides the strongest signal to it. However, this 
kind of mechanism may not be optimal if the AP is already 
overloaded. Here such kind of mechanism are needed 
which not only consider the signal strength, but also 
consider the load on AP. If the AP is overloaded then the 
nodes connect with another nearby AP although the signal 
strength is relatively weak [4]. Typical applications of 
WLAN are campus and organizational networking; back 
haul for public safety and industrial control networks.   
2.2 IEEE 802.16 
IEEE 802.16 is a Wireless Metropolitan Area Network 
(WMAN) technology also known as WiMax. This 
technology offers high bandwidth broadband wireless 
network and separate levels of services to homes and 
businesses, i.e. T1 level is for businesses and best effort 
service level is for home users. It can be used to connect 
the Wi-Fi hotspots with other parts of the internet, also 
provide a wireless alternative to fiber optic and other 
cables for last mile broadband access. The architecture 
of802.16 WMAN is given in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. IEEE 802.16 Architecture 
 
2.3 Wireless Mesh Network 
WMN is an emerging 4th generation broadband wireless 
technology which consists of mesh routers and mesh nodes. 
The mesh routers form the backbone and provide 
connectivity to mesh nodes. Some of the mesh routers in 
WMN perform the functionality of gateways providing 
internet connectivity to mesh nodes through mesh routers.  
The nodes in a WMN act both as a client and as a relay 
router for forwarding traffic for other nodes. In most of the 
cases, the WMN form partial mesh topology, which means 
that there are many routes to every node, so if any route is 
not working then the data traffic can be sent through other 
route. The architecture of WMN is given in Fig. 3. As 
early discussed, the main advantages of WMN are its low 
cost, easy deployment, self healing and self configuring, 
however, few characteristics of it such as multi-hop nature, 
dynamic topological changes and the attack prone medium 
of WMNs are making it more vulnerable to different 
security threats as compared to IEEE 802,11 and IEEE 
802.16.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Wireless Mesh Network Architecture 
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The characteristics of WMN, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 
802.16 are given in table 1. 
  
Table 1 Characteristics comparison  
Characteristic IEEE 
802.11 
IEEE 
802.16 
WMN 
Bandwidth  54 Mbps (802.11a) 
Up to 70 
Mbps 
54 Mbps (However 
decreases with 
increasing hops) 
Coverage Up to 100 meters 
Up to 50 
Kilometers 
Vey flexible and easily 
extendable. 
Encryption WEP 56-bit DES, AES WEP, AES 
Authentication 
Wi-Fi 
Protected 
Access 
(WPA), WPA 
2, 
Mobile 
stations use 
X.509 
certificate to 
authenticate 
with Base 
station 
WEP, WPA, WPA2 
Transmission Point to multipoint 
Point to 
point, point 
to multi-point 
Point to multipoint 
Deployment Cost High Higher Low 
Architecture Centralized Centralized Decentralized 
Connectivity 
basis 
Nodes 
connects with 
Access Point 
on the basis 
of strongest 
signal 
Mobile 
stations (MS) 
connect with 
Base station 
(BS) on the 
basis of 
strongest 
signal 
Mesh nodes connect 
with wireless mesh 
routers on the basis of 
strongest signal; also 
mesh node can connect 
with the wireless 
network through 
another nearby mesh 
node. 
3. Security Challenges in Broadband Wireless 
Networks 
Today, wireless broadband networks are facing two broad 
categories of security threats, i.e. passive attacks and 
active attacks. In passive attacks, the attackers simply 
analyze and listen to the network traffic with the objective 
to capture sensitive information of the target. These kinds 
of attacks compromise the confidentiality of the end user 
traffic. In passive attack, the unauthorized user gain illegal 
access to the network traffic without modifying the traffic 
[13]. Passive attacks are very difficult to detect, as such 
attacks do not harm the user traffic or normal network 
operations. However, most of the passive attacks are later 
used for launching active attacks, as successful passive 
attack gain information related to the target users, network 
topology, traffic pattern etc. Such information can later be 
used for launching active or DoS attack. Passive attacks 
can be eavesdropping or traffic analysis. WMN is more 
vulnerable to passive attacks as compared to IEEE 802.11 
and IEEE 802.16, as WMN is multi-hop in nature, and the 
client nodes may have direct ad-hoc connectivity and relay 
traffic for one another, whereas, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 
802.16 are single hop and there is no ad-hoc type 
connectivity amongst the nodes.  
In the active types of attacks, the attackers have the 
ability to harm the: 
• Network traffic either by tempering, modifications, 
or dropping the packets 
• Broadband wireless network links and established 
routes between source and destination 
• Broadband network resources such as bandwidth 
• Produce jitter in transmission and reduce 
throughput 
Again, WMN is more vulnerable to active attacks due 
to the characteristics of multi-hop and ad-hoc connectivity. 
As multi-hop nature not only reduce the bandwidth 
fairness in WMN, but also increases its routing overheads, 
and most of the attackers exploit these weaknesses and 
successfully launch active attacks against the WMN. On 
the other hand, due to less routing overheads and relatively 
fair bandwidth distribution in single hop wireless 
broadband networks, it is difficult for the attackers to 
launch an active attack against them. The harsh form of 
active attack is DoS attack. The attack types, affect and 
severity is given in table 2 
 
Table 2. Attacks and severity   
Security threats in Broadband wireless networks 
Attack type Compromise Severity 
Passive 
attacks 
Secrecy 
Privacy 
Confidentiality 
More severe for end 
users 
Active 
attacks 
Data integrity 
Service availability 
More severe for 
network and network 
resources 
4. Denial of Service Issues in Broadband 
Wireless Networks 
Denial of Service (DoS) is one of the major issues of all 
types of wireless networks especially broadband wireless 
networks. When authorized users are not provided a 
requested service within a defined maximum waiting time, 
it means that a DoS violation has occurred [15]. It is the 
most harmful and dangerous attack which can be launched 
on any layer of broadband Wireless Network [16]. DoS 
attacks target availability by preventing communication 
between network devices or by preventing a single device 
from sending or receiving traffic [1], where availability 
ensures that authorized users can access the data, services 
and network resources from anywhere anytime. 
4.1 Physical Layer Vulnerabilities 
WMN and IEEE 802.11 uses 2.4 GHz frequency band 
while IEEE 802.16 uses 10-66 GHz and 2-11 GHz bands 
at physical layers. DoS attack can be launched against 
physical layer by using radio jamming device or a source 
of strong noise to interfere the physical channels and may 
compromise the service availability. However this kind of 
attack is not common as it need specialized hardware 
equipment to be launched, furthermore jamming attacks 
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can be detected using radio analyzers. It can create great 
problems during exchange of sensitive information [14] or 
during warfare. For jamming attack in 
• IEEE 802.11, the attacker needs to be close to the 
target AP 
• IEEE 802.16, the attacker needs to be close to the 
Base Station (BS) 
• WMN, the attacker can launch the attack from 
anywhere.  
Due to the vast coverage area and dense deployment of 
wireless mesh routers in WMN, it is more vulnerable to 
physical layer DoS attacks.  
Currently, IEEE 802.11 uses Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS), IEEE 802.16 is using Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDM) and 
Scalable OFDM access (SOFDMA), while WMN uses 
OFDM and Ultra wide band (UWB) mechanisms for radio 
transmission. None of the mechanism is capable enough to 
handle the jamming attack on these broadband wireless 
networks.  
4.2 Link Layer Vulnerabilities 
The IEEE 802.11 and WMN MAC uses shared medium 
amongst the nodes and is highly vulnerable to selfish 
attack and collisions. The selfish attack improves the 
bandwidth, throughput and QoS of the selfish node at the 
cost of another node [12]. An Attack Detection Model in 
WMN is presented in [6], in which a router can blacklist 
the selfish node ID. CSMA/CA with RTS/CTS mechanism 
is adopted for IEEE 802.11 and WMN. The current 
mechanism of CSMA/CA with RTS/CTS can be 
compromised for MAC layer DoS attack either by sending 
bulk of MAC control messages to an innocent neighbour 
or by holding the MAC channel for unnecessary 
continuous transmission keeping an innocent node 
back-off [17] The deauthentication attack is another form 
of DoS attack, which is observed in WMN and IEEE 
802.11 due to the link layer xvulnerability [5]. The Link 
layer of IEEE 802.16 is much better as it uses TDMA for 
uplink and TDM for downlink which ensures collision free 
transmission.  
4.3 Network Layer Vulnerabilities 
As compared to IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16, network 
layer of WMN is highly vulnerable to different DoS 
attacks due to multi-hop environment, as the number of 
hops increase the routing overheads increase. DoS attacks 
at this layer can seriously disrupt the routing mechanism 
or can degrade the network performance by exhausting 
network resources. The network layer DoS attacks in 
WMN can be Blackhole attack in which the malicious 
node absorb all the traffic going toward the target node 
[10], Greyhole attack in which the malicious node 
selectively forwards the packets to the destination node, 
Wormhole attack to create routing disruptions [3], 
Flooding attack in which the attacker transmits a flood of 
packets toward a target node or to congest the network and 
degrade its performance. A flooding DoS attacks are 
difficult to handle. An active cache based defence against 
the flooding style of DoS attacks is proposed in [2]; 
however this mechanism may not be able to handle 
Distributed DoS attack. All these DoS attacks are observed 
in WMN due to its multi-hop nature. As the IEEE 802.11 
and IEEE 802.16 are single-hop broadband wireless 
networks, therefore such kind of attacks are not possible in 
them. It shows that at network layer, IEEE 802.11 and 
IEEE 802.16 are more secure as compared to WMN.  
4.6 Distributed Flooding DoS  
A distributed flooding DoS attack is a huge challenge for 
all the wireless broadband networks, as this attack can 
bring down an entire network or consume the network 
bandwidth to a great extent. This kind of attack is launched 
by first compromising large number of innocent nodes in 
the wireless network termed as Zombies [9], which are 
programmed by highly skilled programmer. These zombies 
send data to selected attack targets such that the aggregate 
traffic congests the network. In most of the cases, the 
DDoS is impossible to prevent and it has the ability to 
flood and overflow the network [7].  
In IEEE 802.11 the target of distributed flooding would 
be Access Point (AP), in WMN the target is wireless mesh 
router while in IEEE 802.16 it is base station.  
4.5 Rogue and selfish backbone devices   
The attacker can seriously disrupt the broadband wireless 
networks by compromising the core network devices. In 
WMN and IEEE 802.11, a selfish mesh router or selfish 
AP can degrade the network performance either causing 
congestion or unavailability. IEEE 802.16, a rogue BS is 
an attacker station which is used to confuse the mobile 
stations of the network; as such kind of BS seems and acts 
like a legitimate BS. Mesh routers or APs are 
compromised by the attackers using sniffers. A sniffer is 
an application which is used for passive traffic analysis 
attack to analyze the network traffic. In IEEE 802.16, the 
BS is compromised by reprogramming a device with the 
hardware address of another legitimate device [18]. The 
hardware address can be detected by intercepting the 
management messages of IEEE 802.1 using sniffers. The 
same mechanism can be applied on mesh routers and APs 
to compromise using hardware address of another network 
device.  
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4.6 Authorization flooding on backbone devices 
WMN and IEEE 802.11 nodes use Probe request frames to 
discover a wireless network, if a wireless network exist 
then the AP respond with Probe response frame. The 
clients select that AP which provides the strongest signal 
to it [4]. Here the attacker can spoof a flood of probe 
request frames presenting a lot of nodes searching for 
wireless network, can seriously overload the AP or 
wireless mesh router. If the load exceeds the threshold 
value will cause the AP or wireless mesh router to stop 
responding and may create service unavailability. In IEEE 
802.16 the client stations use certificate to authenticate and 
register with the BS. The client station can send a bulk of 
registration requests to the BS may result in DoS.  
4.7 Node deprivation attack 
In node deprivation attack, the attackers target a single 
node and isolate it from taking part in the normal network 
operations. In WMN and IEEE 802.11, the nodes first 
authenticate itself with the mesh router or AP, and needs to 
de-authenticate [5] it if the node has no more desire to use 
the network resources. The attacker can spoof the 
de-authentication message on behalf of the target node so 
that to stop it from using the network resources. The same 
vulnerability exist in IEEE 802.16, where the adversary 
eavesdrop the authentication message exchange between 
the node and the BS, and then replays this message many 
times to BS, creating DoS for the target node.  
5. Results of DoS Attacks and possible 
countermeasures  
The results of different DoS attacks on broadband wireless 
networks vary with the nature and type of DoS attack.  
• DoS attack is of low intensity, if launched against a 
single node either to exhaust its battery or to isolate 
it from the network operations.  
• DoS attack is of high intensity if it is launched to 
make services unavailable for a target area in 
wireless broadband networks. Selfish mesh router 
attack in WMN and rogue BS attack is used for this 
purpose.   
• Dos attack will be of highest intensity if it is 
launched to cripple down the entire broadband 
wireless network by distributive flooding. 
Distributed flooding is normally used for this 
purpose to exhaust the bandwidth of the network or 
to overflow the resources of the gateways.  
DoS in any form against any network is regarded as a 
severe attack. Some possible countermeasure needs to be 
investigated to overcome to some extent against DoS and 
related issues in broadband networks.  
• Cognitive radios implementation at physical layer 
needs to be investigated so that to handle the 
jamming and scrambling kind of attacks, which are 
common in all the broadband networks. 
• Current encryption mechanisms used in these 
broadband networks are WEP, DES, and AES, 
which are vulnerable to eavesdropping kind of 
attack. Improved and efficient encryption 
mechanisms needs to be proposed exclusively for 
each of the broadband technology, as successful 
eavesdropping later on facilitate the attackers to 
launch DoS attacks. 
• Intrusion detection mechanism can be used to 
detect and respond to most of the network layer 
threats particularly for WMN environment.  
• A location detection mechanism based on the signal 
strength needs to be devised for the AP and wireless 
mesh router with the ability to identify a malicious 
node for flooding probe request and 
de-authentication kinds of attacks, same mechanism 
can be used for the IEEE 802.16 network to 
identify fake registration request flooding.  
• Improved routing protocols are desirable 
particularly for the multi-hop WMN.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we discussed the important security issues 
and different security threats both active and passive risks 
of important wireless broadband networks. DoS is the 
severe form of active attack against all types of wireless 
networks especially broadband networks, and it is capable 
target a single node, a portion of wireless network, an 
entire wireless network or wireless network resources. 
DoS attacks can compromise the two important features of 
secure wireless networks i.e. data integrity and service 
availability. WMN is more vulnerable to different types of 
DoS attacks are compared to IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 
802.16 due to multi-hop architecture, vast coverage area, 
and ad-hoc end-users connectivity. At Physical layer, all 
the three broadband networks are equally vulnerable to 
DoS threats, while at Link layer, IEEE 802.16 is relatively 
more secure. WMN is highly vulnerable to DoS attacks at 
Network layer due to multi-hop overheads as compared to 
IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16 which are single-hop 
having less routing overheads. Keeping in view the 
importance of WMN, there is a need of such efforts to 
combat DoS attacks. Cognitive radio design and 
implementation, improved encryption and authentication 
mechanisms and exclusive intrusion detection mechanism 
are possible countermeasures which need to be 
investigated. More research is needed in securing 
broadband wireless networks. Only a secure broadband 
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wireless network will be highly accepted for large scale 
commercial deployment. 
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